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ABSTRACT 
 
Attentional bias to emotional stimuli (especially unpleasantly valenced or threatening) is 
a common finding in anxiety and less commonly found in depression.  So-called neutral or “non-
emotional” stimuli varying in attentional processing demands have not been systematically 
investigated or contrasted with emotional stimuli.  In order to clarify the specificity of early 
sensory attentional prioritization of emotionally arousing stimuli in anxiety, the present project 
investigated event-related potentials (ERPs) during the emotion- and color-word Stroop tasks in 
both anxious and depressed participants. Present data show that emotional information is not 
always preferentially processed in anxiety and depression and that preferential processing may 
depend on the processing demands of neutral stimuli.  Systematic examination of the role of 
emotional valence, emotional arousal, and neutral and emotional stimulus processing demands is 
crucial to understanding so-called “preferential” attention for emotional stimuli in anxiety, 
depression, and comorbidity.  Such work can yield insights into cognition-emotion interactions 
in psychopathology that may improve understanding of the etiology and treatment of these 
disorders.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION1 
Emotional disturbances are common in nearly all types of psychopathology, including 
mood and anxiety disorders (Berenbaum, Raghavan, Le, Vernon, & Gomez, 2003).  What is 
sometimes called the cognitive approach to understanding and treating emotional disorders has 
focused almost exclusively on biased emotional information processing as an etiological and 
maintaining factor in various forms of psychopathology, including anxiety disorders (e.g., Beck, 
Emery, & Greenberg, 2005; Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996).  A large body of research 
has demonstrated that anxiety is characterized by cognitive biases and impairments (for reviews, 
see Eysenck & Calvo, 1992; Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007; McNally, 1998), 
particularly an attentional bias to threatening stimuli (Compton, Heller, Banich, Palmieri, & 
Miller, 2000; Nitschke & Heller, 2002).  This phenomenon has been demonstrated in state and 
trait anxiety (Egloff & Hock, 2001) as well as in every anxiety disorder diagnosis in DSM-IV-
TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). 
Many of the studies demonstrating attentional bias in anxiety have relied on stimuli with 
an emotional dimension.  Fewer studies have systematically investigated non-emotional 
(“neutral”) stimuli. The possibility has been raised that anxious participants have fewer cognitive 
resources available for tasks due to a preoccupation with negative or anxious thoughts (Eysenck, 
1997).  Consistent with this idea, anxious participants have shown a general difficulty 
maintaining attentional focus in the face of threatening (e.g., see Eysenck, 1997) and “neutral” 
material (Fox, 1993).  For example, Fox (1993) found that high trait anxiety was associated with 
a general deficit in inhibiting distracting information whether or not the information was 
 emotional.  She speculated that failures to control attentional focus may explain more general 
deficits in concentration and memory reported by anxious participants. 
The specificity of attentional processing of emotional stimuli in anxiety is unclear, given 
existing literature.  “Non-emotional” or neutral stimuli varying in attentional processing demands 
have not been systematically investigated or contrasted with “emotional” stimuli in the anxiety 
literature.  Resolving this issue is critical to understanding attention abnormalities in anxiety, 
especially regarding threatening stimuli and whether this bias generalizes to more cognitively 
demanding stimuli without an explicit emotional dimension.  Resolution of this issue has 
implications for supporting and/or refining the hypothesis that preferential attention to 
threatening stimuli is an etiological and maintaining factor of anxiety. 
Although cognition and emotion have been conceptualized and are often discussed as 
though they are separate constructs, it is not assumed in the present text that these are 
independent constructs but rather that they interact and effectively merge in many contexts.  
Thus, distinguishing between “cognitive” and “emotional” stimuli in the present text is not meant 
to imply that one’s emotional state does not impact the way neutral stimuli are processed, nor 
that one’s cognitive abilities do not impact the way in which emotionally valent stimuli are 
processed.  Indeed, some research suggests that cognition and emotion can be integral or difficult 
to distinguish (e.g., Davidson, 2002; Gray, 2004; Gray, Braver, & Raichle, 2002; Heller & 
Nitschke, 1998; Herrington et al., 2005; Miller, 1996; Mohanty et al., 2005).  Stimuli with an 
explicit emotional valence at higher levels of arousal will be referred to in the present text as 
“emotional” (e.g., emotion words such as “murder” or “joy” in the emotion-word Stroop task), 
and stimuli without an explicit emotional dimension will be referred to as “non-emotional” (e.g., 
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 color words such as “green” written in red ink or “red” written in red ink in the color-word 
Stroop task).   
Attentional Bias to “Emotional” Stimuli in Anxiety 
The seemingly ubiquitous finding of attentional bias to threat across various forms of 
anxiety is qualified by four important issues.  First, pleasant stimuli are frequently not included 
in investigations of attentional bias to threat, so emotional valence may be a confound.  That is, it 
may not be threat in particular that draws attention, but any emotionally intense stimulus. 
Second, when pleasant stimuli are included, they are not always matched to threatening stimuli 
on perceived arousal, nor are arousal levels always reported for emotional stimuli, so emotional 
arousal may be a confound.  Failure to report arousal qualities of stimuli is problematic, because 
emotional arousal may be important in attracting attention (Keil, Bradley, Hauk, Rockstroh, 
Elbert, & Lang, 2002).  Indeed, the prominent circumplex model of emotion decomposes 
emotion into two basic dimensions, valence and arousal (e.g., Barrett & Russell, 1999; Lang, 
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1990).  Further, research on neural processing in emotion has identified 
arousal as a critical factor in recruiting brain regions, such as right occipitotemporal regions (e.g., 
Compton et al., 2003) and amygdala (e.g., Canli, Zhao, Brewer, Gabrieli, & Cahill, 2000).  It is 
therefore important to consider both dimensions as potential contributors to attentional bias.  
Including pleasant stimuli that are matched to threatening stimuli on arousal value is necessary in 
order to demonstrate the specificity or generality of attentional bias to threat in anxiety.  Third, 
when pleasant stimuli have been included in previous investigations, a lack of attentional bias 
toward threat specifically has been found in some anxiety disorders, such as generalized anxiety 
disorder (e.g., Becker, Rinck, Margraf, & Roth, 2001; Martin, Williams, & Clark, 1991), but not 
consistently in other anxiety disorders, such as social phobia (e.g., Becker et al., 2001).  
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 Explaining this inconsistency and whether it is due to an emotional arousal confound may 
facilitate identifying mechanisms of attentional bias in anxiety.  
Fourth, gender has not been systematically considered in the attentional bias literature. 
Lifetime prevalence rates of anxiety are estimated to be higher than any other class of 
psychological disorder (Kessler et al., 2005), and women are estimated to be affected by anxiety 
disorders more than men, with some estimates as large as 2:1 (Craske, 2003).  Despite these 
striking gender differences in rates of anxiety disorders, gender has not been consistently 
assessed in investigations of contributors to the development and maintenance of anxiety 
disorders, leaving open the possibility of gender differences in attentional bias in anxiety. This 
would be important to identify in its own right and may illuminate general mechanisms.  In 
addition, gender has been shown to be important in neural processing of emotional stimuli.  For 
example, gender modulates amygdala activation, and the amygdala is one of the most well-
established brain structures to play a role in emotion (Cahill, 2006).  This brain region is also 
activated more broadly by emotionally arousing stimuli (not only by negative stimuli; e.g., 
Garavan, Pendergrass, Ross, Stein, & Risinger, 2001; Sabatinelli, Bradley, Fitzsimmons, & 
Lang, 2005). 
Gender may also be an important factor in reconciling seemingly contradictory findings 
in processing patterns in nonanxious controls.  In an fMRI study investigating processing of 
emotional pictures in control participants, women showed greater activity in primary and 
secondary visual areas to unpleasant than pleasant pictures (Lang et al., 1998), whereas men 
tended to show greater visual-area activity to pleasant than unpleasant pictures, especially erotic 
pictures (Sabatinelli, Flaisch, Bradley, Fitzsimmons, & Lang, 2004; Lang et al., 1998).  In 
addition, women rated unpleasant pictures as more unpleasant and more arousing than men in 
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 combination with showing larger changes in corrugator EMG (frown-associated muscle) activity 
while viewing unpleasant pictures (Bradley, Codispoti, Sabatinelli & Lang, 2001).  Conversely, 
men rated pleasant (especially erotic) pictures as more arousing than unpleasant pictures and 
responded with more skin conductance (sweat gland) activity (Bradley et al., 2001; Bradley & 
Lang, 2007).  If women preferentially process threat, whereas men preferentially process 
pleasant stimuli at higher levels of arousal, failing to examine gender would lead to unnecessary 
inconsistency across samples.  A better understanding of the nature and time course of male and 
female non-anxious participants’ allocation of attention to emotional stimuli may have important 
treatment implications and may aid in understanding the higher prevalence rates of anxiety 
disorders in women (see also Narrow, First, Sirovatka, & Regier, 2007). 
Four prominent possibilities have been explored regarding the timing of attentional bias 
to emotional stimuli in anxiety.  Three of these hypotheses have focused on threat and none has 
systematically considered gender.  First, attention may be captured quickly and automatically by 
threatening stimuli in a variety of paradigms, including tasks in which masked emotional stimuli 
are conditioned without conscious awareness, or visual search tasks in which biologically threat-
relevant stimuli such as snakes and spiders are detected more rapidly than flower or mushroom 
stimuli (Öhman & Soares, 1998; Öhman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001; Williams et al., 1996).  
Second, it may be difficult to disengage from threatening stimuli.  This hypothesis has been 
investigated using spatial attention tasks in which a threatening cue stimulus is flashed to the left 
or right side of visual space, followed by a non-threatening target to which the participant is 
supposed to respond.  When the target is flashed to the side of visual space opposite to a 
threatening cue, performance is slowed, suggesting preferential prolonged engagement with 
threatening stimuli (e.g., Fox, Russo, & Dutton, 2002).  Third, there is evidence that threatening 
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 stimuli can be initially engaged, followed by avoidance, known as the vigilance-avoidance 
hypothesis (Mogg, Mathews, & Weinman, 1987).  For example, trait-anxious individuals show 
attentional bias to threat in a visual probe task at a shorter stimulus duration (e.g., 500 ms) in the 
absence of evidence for prolonged engagement with the stimulus at longer stimulus durations 
(e.g., 1500 ms; see Mogg, Bradley, Miles, & Dixon, 2004). 
Finally, the emotionality hypothesis, although not cast in terms of emotional arousal, 
holds that emotional stimuli in general will draw attention relative to neutral stimuli (e.g., Martin 
et al., 1991), although attentional biases to threatening versus pleasant stimuli may develop over 
different time frames (Bradley, Mogg, White, Groom, & de Bono, 1999).  The present study 
investigated the time course of attentional processing of emotional stimuli in order to evaluate 
and expand upon these possibilities.  
Emotion-word Stroop task 
Many studies have used a modified Stroop task, called the emotion-word Stroop task, to 
establish and investigate attentional bias in anxiety.  The content of the distracter words is 
threatening (“die”), neutral (“sum”), or pleasant (“joy”).  Participants must respond to the color 
of the word while ignoring the content or meaning of the word. Many studies (reviewed by 
Koven, Heller, Banich, & Miller, 2003; Nitschke & Heller, 2002; Williams et al., 1996) 
demonstrate that color naming is slowed in both anxious and non-anxious participants when the 
distracter word is threatening.  Reaction time to threatening words is typically much slower for 
anxious individuals, suggesting that they have more difficulty than non-anxious individuals in 
filtering out threatening information, even when task-irrelevant.   
In evaluating when and how attention is deployed to emotional stimuli, research has 
relied heavily on dependent measures (such as reaction time) that do not allow continuous 
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 measurement of attentional processing across time.  Unlike reaction time, event-related brain 
potentials (ERPs) offer millisecond-by-millisecond measurement of attentional processes.  
Surprisingly few studies have used ERP measures while investigating attentional bias to 
emotional stimuli in anxiety.   
The present project employed ERPs to investigate the time course of attentional bias in an 
emotion-word Stroop task (the same components were used to contrast the emotion-word with 
the color-word Stroop task, discussed later).  Specifically, P100 and N200 ERP components were 
examined to explore the question of the onset of attentional bias.  P100 is a positive-going 
voltage fluctuation peaking approximately 100 ms after stimulus onset, likely originating from 
extrastriate areas of visual cortex and maximal over occipital regions for visual stimuli.  As more 
attention is allocated to a visual stimulus, more extrastriate neurons are recruited to process the 
stimulus, and P100 amplitude increases (e.g., Luck, Woodman, & Vogel, 2000).  In a task where 
a neutral and an emotional face pair were flashed simultaneously on the left and right side of 
visual space, followed by a horizontal or vertical bar flashed to the left or right side replacing one 
of the face stimuli, P100 was larger when the bar replaced a fearful face than when it replaced a 
neutral face (Pourtois, Grandjean, Sander, & Vuillemier, 2004), suggesting that P100 can be 
sensitive to fear stimuli.  N200 is a negative-going voltage fluctuation over posterior regions for 
visual stimuli. N200 peaks roughly 150-250 ms post-stimulus and has been associated with 
involuntary stimulus discrimination and classification (Näätänen, 1990; Nobre, Allison, & 
McCarthy, 1998; Ritter, Simson, Vaughan, & Macht, 1982) and abstract linguistic processing 
(Grossi & Coch, 2005).  It has been noted in studies involving processing of emotional content 
(Deldin, Keller, Gergen, & Miller, 2000; Kayser, Bruder, Tenke, Stewart, & Quitkin, 2000; 
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 Kayser, Tenke, Nordby, Hammerborg, Hugdahl, & Erdmann, 1997; Schupp, Junghöfer, Weike, 
& Hamm, 2004). 
P300 and N400 components are potentially valuable for assessing later processing of 
emotional material.  The traditional P300 (sometimes called P3b, late positive potential, LPP, or 
late positive complex, LPC) has a predominantly parietal distribution, peaking approximately 
300-600 ms post-stimulus.  P300 amplitude is associated with increased resource deployment 
(e.g., Yee & Miller, 1994) and is thought to reflect context updating and event categorization 
processes (e.g., Coles, Gratton, & Fabiani, 2000; Donchin & Coles, 1988).  P300 is often larger 
for emotional than for neutral picture or word stimuli (e.g., Fischler & Bradley, 2006; Herbert, 
Junghöfer, & Kissler, 2008; Schupp, Cuthbert, Bradley, Birbaumer, & Lang, 1997; Schupp et al., 
2004), reflecting prioritization of emotion processing.  P300 latency is often independent of the 
timing of response-related motor processes and can serve as a more specific measure of stimulus 
evaluation duration (Donchin & Coles, 1988; Duncan-Johnson & Donchin, 1982).   
N400 is a negative-going waveform, commonly seen in response to words, that is 
modulated by semantic meaning, with larger amplitude associated with improbable words and 
smaller amplitude associated with facilitated processing (e.g., for words of higher lexical 
frequency or words “primed” in a given sentential context; Federmeier, Kirson, Moreno, & 
Kutas, 2001; Kutas & Hillyard, 1980; van Petten & Kutas, 1990).  N400 amplitude is reduced for 
emotional stimuli that are primed.  For example, emotional words congruent with prosody elicit 
smaller N400 than do those incongruent with prosody (Schirmer, Kotz, & Friederici, 2002, 
2005).  Emotional words have also been shown to elicit smaller N400 than neutral words in the 
context of a lexical decision task (judge whether the current stimulus is a word or non-word) 
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 where no explicit “priming” of emotion was conducted, though emotional and neutral words 
were presented in blocks (Kanske & Kotz, 2007).   
A small but growing number of studies are using ERPs to investigate the emotion-word 
Stroop task in non-clinical adult samples (e.g., Li, Zinbarg, & Paller, 2007; van Hooff, Dietz, 
Sharma & Bowman, 2008) using unpleasant and neutral (but not pleasant) words.  van Hooff et 
al. investigated two ERP components in an unselected sample, P100 (maximal over occipital 
sensors) and “negative slow wave” (NSW; similar to N400, with maximum over 
frontal/frontocentral sensors).  Unpleasant words were associated with larger P100. There was no 
main effect of valence for NSW at 300-700 ms.  Instead, this component became more negative 
for a subset of unpleasant words that produced RT interference.  These findings were interpreted 
as evidence for both early (larger P100 for unpleasant than neutral words) and later (larger NSW 
for a subset of unpleasant words than neutral) preferential attentional processing of unpleasant 
stimuli. 
More directly related to the present project, Li et al. (2007) included individuals high or 
low in trait anxiety (as measured by the Behavioral Inhibition Scale, Carver & White, 1994) in 
an emotion-word Stroop task with neutral and threat words.  Enhanced occipital P100 to threat 
words was found for both “subliminal” and supraliminal presentation rates.  The P100 effect was 
more pronounced as trait anxiety increased.  P300 amplitude prompted by threatening words was 
moderated by trait anxiety only in the subliminal condition, with higher trait anxiety associated 
with larger P300 to threatening words.  Taken together, these ERP studies using emotion-word 
Stroop tasks suggest that unpleasant words prompt preferential processing at both early and later 
stages in anxiety.  However, in the absence of pleasant words, these findings are not a test 
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 specifically of whether emotional valence or emotional arousal is preferentially associated with 
attentional bias.   
 In apparently the only ERP study to examine the emotion-word Stroop in adult patients 
(Metzger, Orr, Lasko, McNally, & Pitman, 1997), individuals with PTSD had smaller P300 
across all word types (personal pleasant, neutral, and personal traumatic) than healthy controls.  
However, within the PTSD group, P300 was larger to both pleasant and traumatic than neutral 
words, suggesting more resource deployment to arousing words generally, not just to trauma 
words, in line with P300 results reviewed above.  A trend was also observed for longer P300 
latency to trauma-related words in patients with PTSD, suggesting longer evaluation time for 
threatening stimuli.  These findings suggest that timing distinguishes both psychiatric status and 
emotional valence.  To further capitalize on the potential of the emotion-word Stroop paradigm, 
the present project examines ERPs in carefully selected groups of anxious participants to 
elucidate the time course of attentional bias to emotional and non-emotional stimuli.   
Dimensions of Anxiety 
Anxiety is a broad, heterogeneous construct that is sometimes (but often problematically) 
treated as a unitary phenomenon (Lang, 1968; Miller & Kozak, 1993).  However, anxiety can be 
analyzed in terms of at least two distinct dimensions, anxious apprehension and anxious arousal.  
Anxious apprehension is primarily characterized by worry and verbal rumination (Barlow, 1991; 
Heller, Nitschke, Etienne, & Miller, 1997), whereas anxious arousal is characterized by somatic 
tension and physiological arousal (Clark & Watson, 1991).  Although these two types of anxiety 
are not mutually exclusive and may both be present to varying degrees in different disorders, 
anxious apprehension is prominent in generalized anxiety disorder and obsessive compulsive 
disorder, and anxious arousal is prominent in panic attacks and high-stress situations (Nitschke, 
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 Heller, & Miller, 2000).  These two dimensions of anxiety are also distinguished by different 
patterns of lateralized brain activity. 
EEG and fMRI studies indicate that individuals scoring high on measures of anxious 
apprehension show greater activity over the left than right hemisphere (Engels et al., 2007; 
Heller, Nitschke, Etienne et al., 1997).  The left hemisphere has been implicated in studies of 
obsessive-compulsive disorder (e.g., Baxter, Phelps, Mazziotta, Guze, Schwartz, & Selin, 1987; 
Swedo et al., 1989), generalized anxiety disorder (for a review see Nitschke & Heller, 2002, 
2005; Wu, Buchsbaum, Hershey, Hazlett, Sicotte, & Johnson, 1991), and trait anxiety (Tucker, 
Antes, Stenslie, & Barnhardt, 1978), conditions marked by high levels of anxious apprehension.  
These findings linking the left hemisphere to anxiety disorders that feature worry and anxious 
apprehension are consistent with its specialization for language.  Thus, anxiety-related 
impairments in various tasks might be accounted for by interference from iterative activity in 
left-hemisphere verbal processing circuits. 
In contrast, anxious arousal shows more right than left lateral frontal activity coupled 
with more right posterior activity (Engels et al., 2007; Heller & Nitschke, 1998; Nitschke, Heller, 
Palmieri, & Miller, 1999).  Consistent with this observation, the right hemisphere is involved in 
vigilance and autonomic arousal (Compton et al., 2003; Heller, Nitschke, & Lindsay, 1997) and 
has been implicated in studies of patients with panic disorder or panic symptoms (Reiman, 
Raichle, Butler, Herscovitch, & Robins, 1984; Swedo et al., 1989) and in studies of non-patients 
in high-stress situations (Tucker, Roth, Arneson, & Buckingham, 1977).   
Much of the work examining attentional bias in anxious populations has relied on 
measures such as the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, 1968), a measure of 
anxiety that is highly correlated with anxious apprehension and depression (less so with anxious 
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 arousal), indicating that the STAI is not specific to any one type of anxiety, or to anxiety at all 
(Nitschke, Heller, Imig, McDonald, & Miller, 2001).  Thus, research relying solely on the STAI 
as a measure of anxiety conflates anxious apprehension and anxious arousal, in effect treating 
anxiety as a unitary construct.  Moreover, the measure conflates anxiety and depression.   
Sass et al. (2010) used ERPs to investigate the time course of attentional bias in the 
emotion-word Stroop task in individuals scoring high on measures of anxious apprehension or 
anxious arousal.  Anxious apprehension and anxious arousal were associated with evidence for 
early detection of emotional arousal (larger N200 and P100 amplitude to emotionally arousing 
stimuli for anxious apprehension and anxious arousal groups, respectively), in the absence of 
evidence for group differences later in the trial measured by P300 and N400 amplitude.  Anxious 
arousal women showed larger P100 amplitude than anxious arousal men for all stimuli, including 
neutral, perhaps reflecting generalized tonic vigilance for visual input.  Taken together, these 
results suggest that anxious arousal participants bias attention to emotionally arousing stimuli 
earlier than do anxious apprehension participants.  Neither group showed evidence for prolonged 
engagement with emotional stimuli.  Furthermore, the pattern of effects for P100 differed in the 
anxious arousal group as a function of gender.  Results support the suggestion that the 
conjunction of valence, arousal, and gender is critical in examining attentional bias in anxiety. 
Attentional Bias to "Non-Emotional" Stimuli in Anxiety 
Few studies have examined whether anxious participants also show biased processing of 
stimuli that vary in the difficulty of attentional processing demands but do not contain an explicit 
“emotional” dimension.  Resolving this issue has implications for the specificity of attentional 
bias to emotional stimuli, the impact of anxiety on cognitive processing in general, and the 
validity of theories concerning how anxiety disorders develop and are maintained. 
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 Anxious participants have been hypothesized to have fewer cognitive resources available 
for tasks due to a preoccupation with worry and/or vigilance for threat detection (e.g., Eysenck, 
1997).  Attentional control theory has recently been proposed to account for attentional deficits 
in tasks that involve stimuli without an explicit emotional dimension (ACT; Eysenck, et al., 
2007).  ACT proposes that anxiety widens attentional focus in order to detect potential dangers in 
the environment, thereby reducing attentional control with respect to any ongoing task.  These 
effects are thought to be implemented in the brain by increasing the influence of stimulus-driven 
attentional systems associated with temporoparietal or ventral visual processing areas and 
decreasing the influence of goal-directed or top-down processing systems associated with brain 
activity in prefrontal cortical (PFC) areas (e.g., Bishop, 2007; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; 
Eysenck, et al., 2007), resulting in a failure to inhibit task-irrelevant information.  This proposal 
is consistent with a recent integrative account of brain regions involved in processing threatening 
information in anxiety.  Specifically, state anxious individuals show increased activity in 
amygdala and ventral visual processing areas, in combination with decreased PFC activity while 
processing threatening information (Bishop, 2007).  Decreased PFC activity in trait anxiety has 
also been associated with attention to non-emotional, distracting stimuli (Bishop, 2009), 
consistent with ACT’s suggestion that PFC activity is associated with a failure to inhibit 
distracting information (whether or not such information is emotional).  
The ACT model also predicts that anxious individuals will show increased susceptibility 
to task-irrelevant or distracting non-emotional information when attentional or stimulus demands 
are high (Eysenck et al., 2007).  For example, in a task in which participants were to comprehend 
text while ignoring distracting (task-irrelevant) speech, distraction had a deleterious effect on 
comprehension in the high- compared to low-anxious group only when the comprehension task 
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 was demanding (Calvo & Eysenck, 1996).  Bishop (2009) manipulated attentional demand via 
distracter congruence (distracter letter is same or different than target letter) and perceptual load 
(low load was a string of identical target consonants, high load was a string of different 
consonants, only one target).  High trait-anxious participants were slower to identify targets in 
the condition in which the distracter was incongruent with the target, but only under low and not 
high perceptual load.  This pattern of results is broadly consistent with ACT’s assertion that task-
irrelevant, attentionally-demanding distracters should have a negative impact on attention, but 
inconsistent with ACT’s implication that a greater negative impact should have occurred under 
the most demanding condition (incongruent distracter, high load), suggesting that high 
attentional demand does not always impair performance in anxious participants. 
This model of cognitive processing in anxiety is quite compatible with our longstanding 
hypothesis, empirically supported (e.g., Nitschke, Heller, & Miller, 2000; Engels et al., 2007), 
that anxious arousal (similar to state anxiety) is associated with increased activity in right 
temporoparietal regions and that this activity interferes with top-down processing and executive 
functioning.  These brain regions are involved in scanning the visual field, spatial and emotional 
information processing, hierarchical control of physiological threat responding, and other aspects 
of cognitive and physical vigilance behavior.  Anxious apprehension is also likely to interfere 
with cognitive control (see Nitschke & Heller, 2002, 2005, for further discussion), and may be 
associated with a decreased influence of prefrontal regions involved in goal-directed processing, 
particularly as processing demands increase. 
 The time course of processing of non-emotional stimuli in anxiety has been less well 
established than the time course of processing of emotional stimuli, though several ERP studies 
investigated questions regarding the effects of anxiety on tasks using non-emotional stimuli.  
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 Most studies investigating DSM disorders likely reflect contributions of anxious arousal, anxious 
apprehension, and in some cases depression (which is highly comorbid with anxiety disorders, 
e.g., Joormann, Kosfelder, & Schulte, 2005; Kessler, Dupont, Berglund, & Wittchen, 1999).  For 
example, anxious arousal accounted for more variance in symptoms of PTSD than did anxious 
apprehension or depression in one study (Palmieri, Heller, & Miller, unpublished data).  Samples 
with participants who may have high and unquantified levels of anxious apprehension, anxious 
arousal, and anhedonic depression make it difficult to ascertain the contribution of these 
dimensions to attentional processing patterns. 
A study using a fear-induction procedure (the presence of a Chilean rose-haired tarantula) 
with spider-anxious individuals examined state anxiety effects on flanker-task performance 
(judge whether the center arrow was congruent or incongruent with the surrounding arrows, 
Moser, Hajcak, & Simons, 2005).  In the absence of behavioral performance differences, the 
fear-induction procedure was associated with small P300 relative to a control condition (flanker 
task performed in the absence of a tarantula) for target stimuli.  These results were taken as 
evidence that fear/threat interferes with later, more controlled attentional allocation to task-
relevant stimuli. 
In a study investigating sustained attention in male veterans with PTSD, both visual and 
auditory versions of a continuous performance test (CPT-AX) were used (Shucard, McCabe, & 
Szymanksi, 2008).  Participants responded to a quasi-random order of 11 different letters and 
were instructed to respond quickly and accurately to the letter “X” only when it followed the 
letter “A.” Participants with PTSD had longer P300 latency to visual “Xs” that did not follow 
“As,” indicating that longer stimulus evaluation was needed for target processing.  Participants 
with PTSD also showed larger P300 amplitude to irrelevant nontargets (i.e., letters other than 
15 
 
 X’s and A’s) than did controls, which was interpreted as an impaired ability to screen out 
irrelevant information at a later stage.  The authors noted that, whereas much of the literature has 
focused on attentional anomalies in processing primarily trauma-related stimuli in PTSD, their 
study provided evidence for later, more controlled attentional processing difficulties for non-
emotional stimuli. 
In a study of OCD patients without comorbid panic disorder or depression (Di Russo, 
Zaccara, Ragazzoni, & Pallanti, 2000), participants were instructed to respond as quickly as 
possible only when a bar of a certain orientation (e.g., horizontal) appeared and not when a bar of 
another orientation (e.g., vertical) appeared.  Both early and later ERPs were altered in OCD 
patients compared to controls.  Specifically, N100 latency was longer for both targets and 
nontargets in OCD, and P300 amplitude did not differentiate targets from nontargets in OCD 
patients.  This pattern of effects was interpreted as OCD patients showing nonspecific early 
processing of all stimuli, irrespective of whether it was a target and should be prioritized, and 
using more attentional resources on targets than necessary at a later stage. Taken together, the 
three ERP studies just summarized primarily show evidence for disrupted attention at later 
processing stages (P300), whereas only one of the reviewed studies showed evidence for earlier 
attentional anomalies.  In the absence of distinguishing anxious apprehension, anxious arousal, 
and comorbid depression in these samples, it is not known which of these dimension(s) 
contributed to the attentional processing patterns observed. 
In considering how anxious apprehension and anxious arousal may bias attentional 
processing of emotional vs. non-emotional stimuli, it is helpful to compare paradigms that are 
similar with respect to processing demands, differing in the emotional or non-emotional nature of 
the stimuli.  Direct comparisons can then be made, in order to determine whether anxious 
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 participants show evidence for attentional processing that is specific to emotional stimuli.  In this 
vein, the color- and emotion-word Stroop tasks make a promising comparison.  
Color-word Stroop task 
The color-word Stroop task, sometimes considered the “gold standard” of selective 
attention tasks (MacLeod, 1992; MacLeod & Mathews, 1991), uses non-emotional words that 
are presented in a variety of colors, and the individual identifies the ink color while ignoring the 
color content of the word (e.g., the word “blue” printed in red ink).  Attentional selection is 
required, because the ink color must be attended regardless of the meaning of the word or the 
response it prompts.  Compared to a neutral baseline word, which has no intrinsic relationship to 
color (e.g., “blank”), responses are facilitated if the word is the same as the ink color (e.g., “red” 
in red ink), and responses are slowed if the word names a different ink color (e.g., “blue” in red 
ink).  The slowing of RT on incongruent trials is thought to result from word reading being much 
more automatic than ink color naming, making it difficult to direct attention to color instead of 
meaning.  
Several behavioral studies investigating attentional abnormalities in anxiety have used the 
color-word Stroop task.  In an early study, a state manipulation of anxiety adversely affected 
performance accuracy in an incongruent but not congruent condition (Hochman, 1967).  Fox 
(1993) compared high and low trait-anxious participants on incongruent, neutral, and threatening 
words in a “separated” Stroop task (attend and respond to a central color patch and ignore the 
word in the periphery) and a “traditional” Stroop task (attend to the centrally-presented word and 
respond to the color of the word).  This study found interference effects in high trait-anxious 
participants (as measured by the STAI) when the incongruent word was presented in the 
periphery.  High trait-anxious participants also took longer to name the color of threatening 
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 words than neutral words, regardless of whether the threatening word was presented centrally or 
in the periphery.  These results were interpreted as supporting a general inability to maintain 
attentional focus when any distracting stimulus is presented in the periphery, rather than a 
specific inability to ignore threatening stimuli per se.  Based on RT methods alone, it is difficult 
to assess whether and when attentional prioritization of emotional compared to incongruent or 
congruent stimuli would have occurred.   
A number of studies using ERPs have investigated the time course of processing in the 
color-word Stroop task.  Only a few of these studies have also investigated anxious participants.  
In the first ERP Stroop studies, Warren and Marsh (1979) and Duncan-Johnson and Kopell 
(1981) focused on P300 latency as an index of stimulus evaluation.  Both studies found no 
differences in P300 latency between congruent and incongruent Stroop conditions.  On the basis 
of these null results, the authors argued that Stroop interference occurs after stimulus evaluation, 
during a response selection stage.  P300 amplitude tends to be larger to incongruent words than 
to neutral and/or congruent words (Rebai, Bernard, & Lannou, 1997) but is sometimes larger to 
congruent than to incongruent words (e.g., Ilan & Polich, 1999).  This pattern of effects is 
consistent in showing that neutral words tend to elicit the smallest P300, presumably due to 
fewer resources needed to process words that have nothing to do with the task-relevant response 
(color), unlike incongruent and congruent words. 
A negativity peaking between approximately 400 and 500 ms at primarily fronto-central 
sensors is another component commonly found in color-word Stroop studies (e.g., Liotti, 
Woldorff, Perez, & Mayberg, 2000; Rebai et al., 1997; Silton et al., 2010; West, 2003; West & 
Alain 1999, 2000).  Rebai et al. (1997) investigated several ERP components in a Stroop task 
involving congruent and incongruent (but not neutral) conditions using 5 electrode sites (Fz, Cz, 
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 Oz, and right and left parietal) in two conditions (reading words vs. “mental naming” of words).  
In the absence of earlier (P100, N200) differences, N400 amplitude was larger at Cz for 
incongruent stimuli than congruent stimuli in the “mental naming” condition.  Larger N400 for 
incongruent stimuli presumably reflects semantic incongruity between the meaning and color of 
the word.  Later studies (e.g., West, 2003; West & Alain 1999, 2000) have sometimes termed 
this component “N450,” although it is unclear whether N400 and N450 are functionally distinct.  
N450 tends to be larger for incongruent than congruent and/or neutral stimuli at fronto-central 
sensor locations.  One can thus interpret larger N450 amplitude as an index of the need for 
cognitive control (e.g., Curtin & Fairchild, 2003) or in a complementary fashion, as an index of 
the degree of incongruity between word meaning and word color (e.g., Rebai et al., 1997).  
Taken together, ERP studies investigating the color-word Stroop task generally find a 
lack of early ERP differences between incongruent and congruent stimuli (e.g., Warren & Marsh, 
1979; Rebai et al., 1997).  P300 amplitude and latency also tend not to differ between 
incongruent and congruent stimuli (e.g., Duncan-Johnson & Kopell, 1981; Warren & Marsh, 
1979).  Larger N400/N450 amplitude for incongruent than congruent and/or neutral stimuli has 
been the most reliable component to distinguish incongruent from congruent stimuli, with neutral 
stimuli being inconsistently included in investigations.  
Few ERP studies have investigated the color-word Stroop task in anxious populations.  
Those that do have tended to focus on error-related negativity (ERN).  The ERN is a 
frontocentrally maximal, response-locked ERP component peaking approximately 50-150 ms 
after response execution, with amplitude largest for error trials in tasks emphasizing accuracy 
(e.g., Falkenstein, Hohnsbein, Hoorman, & Blanke, 1990; Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer, & 
Donchin 1993).  For example, individuals with OCD evidenced larger and prolonged ERN to 
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 error trials during a color-word Stroop task, and ERN amplitude correlated positively with 
severity of OCD symptoms (Gehring, Himle, & Nisenson, 2000).  These results were interpreted 
as support for the hypothesis that error signals are hyperactive in OCD.  Hajcak, McDonald, and 
Simons (2003) focused on individuals scoring high on a measure of anxious apprehension 
(PSWQ) and also examined performance on a color-word Stroop task.  Participants scoring high 
on the PSWQ showed enhanced ERN amplitude relative to phobic and control participants, 
indicating that sensitivity to error generalizes beyond OCD to anxious apprehension.   
In summary, few studies have investigated the color-word Stroop task in anxiety using 
ERPs (let alone systematically for anxious apprehension and anxious arousal).  The few ERP 
studies that focus on anxiety have tended to focus on error processing.  Early and later stages of 
stimulus-related processing have not been systematically differentiated.  Lack of such 
differentiation makes it difficult to compare results to those in the emotion-word Stroop 
literature.  Furthermore, no ERP studies have systematically compared emotion- and color-word 
Stroop tasks in anxiety, in order to more carefully examine the specificity of various attentional 
processing stages for emotional stimuli, despite its theoretical importance. 
The Experimental Problem 
Although recent theorizing assumes it, the specificity of attentional bias to emotional 
stimuli in anxiety is unclear.  So-called neutral or “non-emotional” stimuli varying in attentional 
processing demands have not been systematically investigated or contrasted with emotional 
stimuli.  Clarifying this issue is critical in understanding the specificity of attention to emotional 
(particularly threatening) stimuli in anxiety and whether this bias generalizes to cognitively 
demanding stimuli without an explicit emotional dimension.  Resolution of this issue has 
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 implications for supporting and/or refining the hypothesis that preferential attention to 
threatening stimuli is an etiological and maintaining factor of anxiety.  
The attentional bias literature has not differentiated types of attention well, typically 
treating attention as a monolithic construct. The present study is thus limited in the specificity 
with which predictions can be made in terms of a) which attentional processes should be affected 
and b) when. The time course of attentional phenomena is operationalized here in terms of the 
latency of ERP components: components < 300 ms are considered "early" and components > 300 
ms are considered "late". 
In order to investigate the specificity of attentional prioritization of emotional stimuli, the 
present project first investigated ERP results within the emotion-word Stroop task to test whether 
early preferential sensory processing seen previously in anxious apprehension and anxious 
arousal (Sass et al., 2010) is specific to anxiety, generalizes to anhedonic depression, or 
generalizes to comorbid anxiety and depression.  Second, the present project compared ERP 
results from the emotion- and color-word Stroop tasks in anxious apprehension, anxious arousal, 
anhedonic depression, comorbid (high on measures of anxious apprehension, anxious arousal, 
and anhedonic depression), and control participants, in order to investigate the specificity of 
attentional prioritization of emotional versus non-emotional stimuli in anxiety.  The comorbid 
group is included in order to facilitate comparisons of the present project with a literature that 
has largely relied on measures of trait anxiety (such as the STAI) that effectively conflate anxiety 
and depression and provide unknown comorbidity.  The anhedonic depression group is included 
as a control group, in order to disambiguate potential differential patterns of processing in the 
anxious and comorbid groups.  These were the main hypotheses: 
1) Within the emotion-word Stroop task, if early preferential sensory processing of 
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 unpleasant or emotionally arousing stimuli is specific to anxiety (reflected in P100 and/or N200 
amplitude), the anhedonic depression and control groups should not show such early preferential 
processing.  Based on inconsistency in the literature, it is unclear whether early effects will occur 
in the comorbid group.  
2) In comparing the emotion- and color-word tasks, if early preferential sensory 
processing of unpleasant or emotionally arousing compared to attentionally-demanding-neutral 
stimuli is specific to anxiety, P100 and/or N200 amplitude will be larger for emotionally 
arousing than neutral stimuli in anxious participants.  Conversely, attentionally-demanding-
neutral stimuli (i.e., congruent and incongruent stimuli from the color-word Stroop task) may 
require a) equivalent or b) greater attentional resources than emotional stimuli at an early 
attentional stage.  
3) If later preferential attentional processing of unpleasant or emotionally arousing 
stimuli is specific to anxiety, P300 amplitude will be larger for emotionally arousing than non-
emotional attentionally-demanding stimuli in anxious participants.  Conversely, attentionally- 
demanding-neutral stimuli (i.e., congruent and incongruent stimuli from the color-word Stroop 
task) may require a) equivalent or b) greater attentional resources than emotional stimuli at a 
later stage in processing.  
In the color-word Stroop task, N400 is sometimes larger for incongruent than congruent 
or neutral stimuli, and N400/N450 amplitude has been suggested to be an index of the need for 
cognitive control.  Thus, N400 may be larger for congruent and/or incongruent than emotionally 
arousing words if attentionally demanding neutral words require more cognitive control to 
process. This effect may be pronounced in anxiety.  An alternative hypothesis is that neutral 
words may be incongruent with overall expectancies for emotional content in the emotion-word 
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 Stroop, and for color meaning in the color-word Stroop task. Thus, N400 amplitude may be 
larger for neutral words in the emotion-word than color-word Stroop task if emotion is more 
strongly primed in than color meaning, and this effect may be particularly pronounced in anxiety. 
Because N400 is a relatively automatic response to words (and semantic stimuli more 
broadly), it could be viewed similarly to earlier ERP components such as P100 and N200, which 
also index relatively automatic processing. Given that the time course of attentional phenomena 
(including the processes indexed) is underdeveloped in the attentional bias literature but that 
N400 clearly follows some early phenomena, the present study treats N400 as a "late" 
component.  
In order to address hypotheses 2 and 3, targeted comparisons were made between the 
emotion- and color-word Stroop tasks.  First, to address preferential processing of unpleasant 
over neutral stimuli, unpleasant stimuli were compared to neutral stimuli from the color-word 
Stroop task (congruent and incongruent words were each compared to unpleasant words, and an 
average of congruent and incongruent words was compared to unpleasant words).  This analysis 
addressed the following possibilities: a) whether unpleasant stimuli were prioritized over neutral 
stimuli which were attentionally demanding (due to potential conflict), b) whether unpleasant 
stimuli and attentionally–demanding-neutral stimuli did not differ in terms of attentional 
prioritization, or c) whether attentionally-demanding-neutral stimuli were prioritized over 
unpleasant stimuli. 
Second, to address preferential processing of emotionally arousing over neutral stimuli, 
an average of emotionally arousing (pleasant and unpleasant) stimuli was compared to neutral 
stimuli from the color-word Stroop task (congruent and incongruent words were each compared 
to emotionally arousing words, and an average of congruent and incongruent words was 
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 compared to an average of emotionally arousing words).  This analysis addressed the following 
possibilities: a) whether emotionally arousing stimuli more generally were prioritized over 
neutral stimuli which were attentionally demanding (due to potential conflict), b) whether 
emotionally arousing stimuli and attentionally-demanding-neutral stimuli did not differ in terms 
of attentional prioritization, or c) whether attentionally-demanding-neutral stimuli were 
prioritized over emotionally arousing stimuli.   
Gender was analyzed based on well-established evidence for its importance in the neural 
processing of emotional stimuli and on the need to understand the greater prevalence rate of 
anxiety and depression disorders in women than men.  Women scoring highly on measures of 
anxious apprehension, anxious arousal, and anhedonic depression may show pronounced 
preferential attention to emotional compared to non-emotional stimuli. An unusually large data 
base was available for testing these hypotheses.  The author was involved throughout graduate 
school from the beginning of EEG data collection, had a primary role and responsibility for EEG 
data collection and analysis preprocessing later in graduate school, and developed the present 
rationale and hypotheses.  This dissertation pursued novel processing and analysis of this data set 
in order to address the issues discussed above. 
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 CHAPTER 2  
METHOD1  
Participants 
Participants were 130 (68 female) undergraduates with useable emotion- and color-word 
Stroop data.  Participants were paid volunteers (mean age = 19.0, SD = 1.6) recruited via group 
questionnaire screening sessions.  Participants were classified as high comorbidity (N = 22, 16 
female), high anxious apprehension (N = 17, 13 female), high anxious arousal (N = 24, 12 
female), high anhedonic depression (N = 24, 7 female), or control (N = 43, 20 female) on the 
basis of responses on the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & 
Borkovec, 1990; Molina, & Borkovec, 1994) and the Mood and Anxiety Symptom 
Questionnaire (MASQ; Watson, Clark, et al., 1995; Watson, Weber, et al., 1995; see Appendix 
A).  Based on a sample of more than 1000 participants, cutoffs for group participation were 
formed for the PSWQ, MASQ Anxious Arousal scale, and an 8-item subset of the MASQ 
Anhedonic Depression scale that emphasizes depressed mood rather than low positive affect 
(Nitschke et al., 2001).  The comorbid group scored above the 80th percentile on the PSWQ, 
MASQ Anxious Arousal scale (MASQAA), and a depressed-mood subscale (Nitschke et al., 
2001) of the MASQ Anhedonic Depression scale (MASQAD8).  The anxious apprehension 
group scored above the 80th percentile on the PSWQ and below the 50th percentile on the other 
two scales.  The anxious arousal group scored above the 80th percentile on the MASQAA and 
below the 50th percentile on the other two scales.  The anhedonic depression group scored above 
the 80th percentile on the MASQAD8 and below the 50th percentile on the other two scales.  The 
control group scored below the 50th percentile on all three scales.  Percentiles were derived from 
the group questionnaire screening sessions and were not gender-specific.  The questionnaires 
were administered for a second time when participants individually attended the laboratory tour.  
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 Table 1 reports participant demographics.  All participants were right-handed, native speakers of 
English with self-reported normal color vision.  Participants were given a laboratory tour, 
informed of the procedures of the study, and screened for claustrophobia or contraindications for 
MRI participation because of other procedures as part of a larger protocol.  
Stimuli and Experimental Design 
Participants completed two tasks, an emotion- and a color-word Stroop task.  The order 
of presentation of the two tasks was counterbalanced across participants.  Word presentation and 
response recording were controlled by STIM software (James Long Company, Caroga Lake, 
NY).  The emotion-word Stroop task consisted of blocks of pleasant or unpleasant words 
alternating with blocks of neutral words.  Several pilot studies for this project as well as 
published work show that a blocked design is more effective in eliciting emotion-word Stroop 
interference than an intermixed design (e.g., Compton et al., 2003; Dalgleish, 1995).  The color-
word Stroop task consisted of blocks of color-congruent or color-incongruent words alternating 
with blocks of neutral words.  Additional neutral trials were intermixed 50:50 in congruent and 
incongruent blocks to prevent the development of word-reading strategies.  This type of blocked 
design in the color-word Stroop task has been shown to effectively elicit Stroop interference 
(Banich et al., 2000; Milham, Banich, Claus, & Cohen, 2003).  The order of presentation of 
blocks in the present investigation was counterbalanced for each participant.  In addition to the 
16 word blocks, there were four fixation blocks - one at the beginning, one at the end, and two in 
the middle of the session.  In the fixation condition, a fixation cross was presented for 1500 ms. 
Each task consisted of 256 trials in 16 blocks (four pleasant, four unpleasant, and eight 
neutral; or four congruent, four incongruent, and eight neutral) of 16 trials, with a variable ITI 
(2000 +/- 225 ms) between trial onsets.  Each trial consisted of one word presented in 1 of 4 ink 
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 colors (red, yellow, green, blue) on a black background, with each color occurring equally often 
with each word type (pleasant, neutral, unpleasant; or congruent, incongruent, neutral).  The 256 
word stimuli included in the emotion-word Stroop task were selected from the Affective Norms 
for English Words set (Bradley & Lang, 1999).  Sixty-four were pleasant (e.g., birthday, ecstasy, 
laughter), 64 were unpleasant (e.g., suicide, war, victim), and two sets of 64 were neutral (e.g., 
hydrant, moment, carpet).  The words were carefully selected on the basis of established norms 
for valence, arousal, frequency of usage in the English language (Bradley & Lang 1999), and 
number of letters.  The color-word task consisted of congruent trials in which the word named 
the ink color in which it was printed (e.g., the word ‘‘RED’’ printed in red ink), incongruent 
trials in which the word named a color incongruent with the ink color in which it was printed 
(e.g., ‘‘GREEN’’ in red ink), and neutral trials in which the word was unrelated to color (e.g., 
‘‘LOT’’ in red ink).  Neutral words were matched with color words for word frequency and 
length.  Words ranged from three to eight letters and were centered on a black background.  
Words were presented in capital letters using Tahoma 72-point font at a distance of 1.35 
m from the participant’s eyes, for a vertical span of 1.5 degrees and a horizontal span of 2.5 to 
9.3 degrees for the emotion-word Stroop, and 3.2 to 8.7 degrees for the color-word Stroop.  
Participants responded with their index and middle fingers using a four-button response box 
(James Long Company) under each hand, with the emotion- and color-word tasks using the same 
mapping of color to button for a given subject.  Given that the number of neutral trials was 
double that for pleasant or unpleasant words within the emotion-word Stroop task, a subsampling 
of 128 neutral trials was undertaken.  Thus, the full set of 128 or a subset of 64 neutral trials 
could be used in analyses.  ERP analyses subsequently reported are based on the subset of 64 
neutral trials.  Critical tests of hypotheses did not differ when using the full set of 128 or the 
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 subset of 64.4  Given differing trial numbers in the emotion- and color-word Stroop tasks, 
subsampled averages were used in analyses reported in the Results section.  Specifically, 
pleasant and unpleasant trials were subsampled to N=32 in order to equate them in number with 
available congruent and incongruent trials.  Critical tests of hypotheses did not differ when using 
the full set of 64 or the subset of 32.4   
The emotion- and color-word Stroop tasks involved a blocked design, which means that 
primarily tonic rather than phasic attention effects were manipulated as a function of word type. 
Furthermore, blocking was done differently in the two tasks. In the emotion-word Stroop task, 
pleasant and unpleasant blocks were not interspersed with neutral trials. In the color-word Stroop 
task, during congruent and incongruent blocks half the trials were neutral, as well as having 
neutral-only blocks.  These considerations will be kept in mind when interpreting results.  
A further consideration in comparing groups on the emotion- and color-word Stroop tasks 
is whether groups actually differ in performance on these tasks.  Loren and Jean Chapman (e.g., 
Chapman & Chapman, 1978, 2001)  have discussed the pitfalls of drawing conclusions about 
whether a particular group shows a "differential deficit" on Task A vs. Task B compared to 
another group, unless Task A and Task B have been matched psychometrically on item difficulty 
and true score variance (the product of the reliability of the test and the observed score variance), 
because not matching on true score variance can artifactually indicate differences in performance 
between the two tasks when none actually exists. 
 In the present study, within each of the emotion- and color-word tasks, the 5 groups 
performed equally on both accuracy and RT measures (i.e., Group did not interact with either 
accuracy or RT within either the emotion- or color-word tasks, ps > .1).  A separate repeated-
measures ANOVA for accuracy and RT was conducted, including 7 levels (pure congruent, pure 
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 incongruent, neutral congruent, neutral incongruent, pleasant, neutral, and unpleasant).  These 
ANOVAs revealed that none of the condition levels interacted with Group (ps> .1) for either 
accuracy or RT.  Per Chapman and Chapman (1978, 2001), although group behavioral 
differences in processing emotional or non-emotional stimuli did not emerge, one cannot 
conclude that groups actually would not differ if the tasks had been psychometrically matched. 
Any ERP differences between the emotion- and color-word Stroop task evidenced by a particular 
group relative to another group in the present study therefore cannot be considered an 
unambiguous "differential deficit," since tasks were not psychometrically matched.  Any Group 
x Task interactions that emerge will be interpreted with this constraint.  
Electrophysiological Recordings 
Participants were seated in a comfortable chair in a quiet room that was adjacent to a 
room where the experimenter controlled stimulus presentation and EEG data collection.  The 
participant room was connected to the experimenter room by intercom.  EEG was recorded with 
a custom-designed Falk Minow 64-channel cap with Ag/AgCl electrodes spaced equidistantly.  
The left mastoid was the online reference for all EEG and electrooculogram (EOG) sites.  
Electrodes placed above and below each eye and near the outer canthus of each eye recorded 
vertical and horizontal EOG for off-line eye-movement artifact correction of EEG.  Electrode 
impedances were maintained below 20 Kohms.  Amplifier bandpass was .1 to 100 Hz, and data 
were digitized at 250 Hz.  Electrode positions were recorded using a Zebris ELPOS digitizer 
(Zebris Medizintechnik, Tübingen, Germany). 
Data Reduction 
Via Brain Electrical Source Analysis (BESA 5.1) software, muscle, movement, and 
miscellaneous artifacts were removed manually, and eye-blink artifact was removed (Berg & 
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 Scherg, 1994).  If a particular channel was off-scale for many trials (approximately 10%), all 
trials for that channel were removed from analyses; otherwise epochs over which a given channel 
was off-scale were discarded (across all channels).  Individual participant data with more than 
5% of channels discarded due to artifact were not included in analyses (N = 4).  Trials accurately 
responded to were averaged for each condition.  ERP trials were rejected if reaction times were 
<350 ms or >1400 ms.  The electrode configuration was then transformed to BESA’s standard 
81-channel virtual montage using spherical spline interpolation (Perrin, Pernier, Bertrand, & 
Echallier, 1989), reflecting the 10-10 system.  An average reference was computed for each time 
point as the mean voltage over the 81 standard virtual scalp electrodes.  Data were exported from 
BESA and each channel baseline-adjusted by subtracting the average amplitude for the 200 ms 
before stimulus onset.  Waveform averages were smoothed using a 101-weight, .1-20 Hz digital 
filter for P100 and N200 components and a 101-weight, .1-8 Hz digital filter for P300 and N400 
(Cook & Miller, 1992; Nitschke, Miller, & Cook, 1998).  To avoid identification of spurious 
peaks, a combination peak/area measure was used.  Voltage 48 ms around the point estimate of 
the peak was averaged for P100 and N200, and voltage 96 ms around the peak was averaged for 
P300 and N400.  The difference in time averaged around the peak for early (<300 ms) and late (> 
300 ms) components was associated with faster versus slower duration of the components.  The 
latency associated with the peak was also recorded.  All component scores were obtained for 
each of the 81 electrodes.  Participants who displayed amplitude values less than or greater than 
3 standard deviations from the mean for a particular component at more than two electrode sites 
were excluded from analyses including that component (N = 8).4 
Four ERP components were scored: P100 (88-128 ms), N200 (160-240 ms), P300 (300-
500 ms in color-word and 448-580 ms in emotion-word Stroop), and N400 (448-580 ms).  The 
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 window for P300 peak amplitude is typically set to 300-600 ms in the color-word Stroop task 
and in many other oddball paradigms (e.g., Duncan-Johnson & Kopell, 1981; Ilan & Polich, 
1999, 2001).  However, mean P300 peak latency has been closer to 300 ms than 600 ms in such 
studies (Ilan & Polich, 1999, 2001).  Examination of individual participant data indicated that 
although some subjects displayed two positive peaks during this window, almost everyone 
displayed a first peak which occurred before 500 ms and was larger than the second peak. 
Examination of individual participants’ emotion-word Stroop waveforms indicated that many 
participants displayed only one peak after 450 ms, which was larger in magnitude than those 
participants who displayed a second peak closer to 300 ms.  These observations are consistent 
with research using an emotion-word Stroop task, which reported a mean P300 latency close to 
500 ms (e.g., Thomas, Johnstone, & Gonsalvez, 2007).  Thus, the different P300 windows for the 
color- and emotion-word Stroop were different but are rooted in past literature as well as present 
data.  
For P100 and N200, sites for analysis were chosen based on examination of current 
source density (CSD) estimates across conditions and across groups.  Current source density is a 
transformation of the EEG to its second spatial derivative, essentially a spatial high-pass filter 
that reduces the spread of focal brain activity on the scalp surface and enhances the contribution 
of the nearby cortical surface to the recorded electrode signal (Hoechstetter et al., 2004; Nunez et 
al., 1999).  Sites where CSD activity was maximal for P100 (P7, P8, PO7, PO8, O1, O2) and 
N200 (P7, P8, P9, P10, PO7, PO8, PO9, PO10) were chosen.  Sites for P300 (P1, P2, P3, P4) and 
N400 (FC1, FC2, FC3, FC4) were chosen by integrating previous literature (e.g., Schirmer, 
Kotz, & Friederici, 2005) with inspection of present grand-average waveforms where effects 
were maximal (see Figures 1 and 2). 
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 CHAPTER 3  
RESULTS1 
Emotion-word Stroop Behavioral Performance  
RT was analyzed for correct responses occurring between 350 and 1400 ms (M = 665 ms, 
SD= 98 ms).  Performance accuracy was high (mean error rate = 3.4 %, SD = 2.8).  A Group 
(comorbid, anxious apprehension, anxious arousal, anhedonic depression, control) x Gender 
(female, male) x Emotion (pleasant, neutral, unpleasant) MANOVA was conducted exploring 
linear (valence: comparing pleasant with unpleasant) and quadratic (arousal: comparing pleasant 
and unpleasant with neutral) orthogonal univariate trends on the emotion factor.  P-values reflect 
the Huynh-Feldt correction for sphericity where appropriate.  An alpha level of .05 was used.  
No main effects or interactions were significant for emotion-word Stroop RT. 
Emotion-word Stroop: Early Visual Sensory Processing  
A Group (comorbid, anxious apprehension, anxious arousal, anhedonic depression, 
control) x Gender (female, male) x Emotion (pleasant, neutral, unpleasant) x Hemisphere (left, 
right) MANOVA was conducted separately for P100, N200, P300, and N400 amplitude and 
P300 latency (see Figure 1 for grand-average waveforms for representative channels).  
P100.  P100 amplitude was larger over the right than left hemisphere, F (1, 120) = 31.20, 
p < .001, and larger for pleasant and unpleasant than neutral words, quadratic Emotion F (1, 120) 
= 30.45, p < .001.  The Hemisphere main effect was qualified by a Group x Gender x 
Hemisphere interaction,4 F (4, 120) = 2.46, p = .049.  This effect was explored with Gender x 
Hemisphere ANOVAs conducted separately for each group.  A Gender x Hemisphere interaction 
emerged only in the anxious apprehension group, F (1, 15) = 5.49, p = .033, followed up 
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 separately for each gender.  Anxious apprehension men but not women showed larger P100 
amplitude over right than left hemisphere. 
N200.  N200 amplitude was larger in women, F (1, 120) = 6.17, p = .014, larger over left 
than right hemisphere, F (1, 120) = 6.07, p = .015, and larger for emotionally arousing stimuli, 
quadratic Emotion F (1, 120) = 34.39, p < .001.  A Group x linear Emotion interaction, F (1, 
120) = 4.00, p =.004, and a Gender x linear Emotion interaction, F (1, 120) = 5.44, p =.021, 
emerged.  Separate Emotion ANOVAs exploring linear and quadratic effects in light of 
hypothesis 1 were conducted for each group to follow up the Group x Emotion interaction (see 
Figure 3).  The comorbid, anxious arousal, and control groups did not show any emotion effects.  
The anxious apprehension group showed larger N200 amplitude for emotionally arousing than 
neutral stimuli, quadratic F (1, 16) = 13.96, p = .002.  The anhedonic depression group showed 
larger N200 amplitude for unpleasant than pleasant words, linear Emotion, F (1, 23) = 6.99, p = 
.015, and larger N200 amplitude for emotionally arousing than neutral stimuli, quadratic, F (1, 
23) = 4.37, p = .048.  Following up the Gender x linear Emotion interaction, women showed a 
trend for larger N200 amplitude for unpleasant than pleasant stimuli, F (1, 67) = 3.76, p =.057.  
Consistent with the main effect, N200 amplitude was larger for emotionally arousing than neutral 
stimuli in both genders (ps < .001).   
Emotion-word Stroop: Later Processing  
P300.  In the absence of main effects, only a Gender x quadratic Emotion x Hemisphere 
interaction emerged, F (1, 120) = 6.82, p = .010.  Emotion x Hemisphere ANOVAs were 
conducted separately for each gender.  Men showed a quadratic Emotion x Hemisphere 
interaction, F (1, 61) = 4.43, p = .039, followed up separately for each hemisphere.  P300 
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 amplitude was larger for emotionally arousing than neutral stimuli in the left hemisphere only, F 
(1, 61) = 5.14, p = .027. 
P300 latency.  In the absence of main effects, a Group x quadratic Emotion interaction, F 
(4, 120) = 4.32, p = .003, and a Gender x quadratic Emotion x Hemisphere interaction, F (1, 120) 
= 4.95, p = .028, emerged.  The Group x quadratic Emotion interaction was followed up with 
separate Emotion ANOVAs for each group (see Figure 3).  P300 latency was shorter for 
emotionally arousing than neutral stimuli in the anxious arousal, F (1, 23) = 5.37, p = .030, and 
anhedonic depression groups, F (1, 23) = 6.93, p = .015.  There were no emotion effects in the 
comorbid, anxious apprehension, or control groups.  Following up the Gender x Emotion x 
Hemisphere interaction, Emotion x Hemisphere ANOVAs were conducted separately for each 
gender.  In the absence of a main effect of emotion or hemisphere in either gender, only men 
showed a quadratic Emotion x Hemisphere interaction, F (1, 61) = 5.04, p = .028.  P300 latency 
was shorter for emotionally arousing than neutral stimuli in the left, F (1, 61) = 7.13, p = .010, 
but not right hemisphere. 
N400.  N400 amplitude was larger for emotionally arousing than neutral stimuli, F (1, 
120) = 8.13, p = .005, and was larger over left than right hemisphere, F (1, 120) = 9.92, p = .002.  
No other main effects or interactions were significant. 
Emotion Vs. Color-word Stroop Behavioral Performance  
RT was analyzed for correct responses occurring between 350 and 1400 ms for the color-
word Stroop task.  The mean response was 799 ms (SD 127 ms), and performance accuracy was 
high (mean error rate was 3.5%, SD = 2.7).  Color-word RT was compared to emotion-word RT 
reported above, via a Condition factor created by pooling pleasant and congruent RT and pooling 
unpleasant and incongruent RT. A Group (comorbid, anxious apprehension, anxious arousal, 
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 anhedonic depression, control) x Gender (female, male) x Task (emotion-word, color-word), x 
Condition MANOVA was conducted.  An alpha level of .05 was used.  RT was longer in the 
color- than emotion-word Stroop task, F (1, 120) = 43.27, p < .001.  A main effect of condition, 
F (1, 120) = 194.84, p < .001, was qualified by a Gender x Condition interaction, F (1, 120) = 
4.21, p = .042.  Main effects and interactions with the “condition” factor were not fully 
interpretable with respect to critical task comparisons, because the pooling done to create this 
factor.  Targeted analyses dissected the “condition” factor and were conducted separately for 
each gender.  Specifically, 1) unpleasant RT was compared separately to congruent RT, 
incongruent RT, and an average of congruent and incongruent RT.  2) An average of emotionally 
arousing RT (pleasant and unpleasant) was compared separately to congruent, incongruent, and 
an average of congruent and incongruent RT.  In the first set of contrasts, a main effect of task 
emerged in each contrast, with longer RT in the given CW condition than the unpleasant 
condition (ps < .001).  A Gender x Task interaction emerged only in the comparison of 
unpleasant with incongruent stimuli, F (1, 128) = 5.08, p = .026.  Separate ANOVAs were 
conducted for each condition and each gender.  Men were faster than women in the incongruent 
and not unpleasant condition, F (1, 128) = 6.59, p = .011.  RT was slower for incongruent than 
unpleasant words in men, F (1, 61) = 77.78, p < .001, and women, F (1, 67) = 123.41, p < .001.  
In the second set of contrasts, a main effect of task emerged in each contrast, with longer RT in 
the given CW condition than the average of the emotionally arousing stimuli (ps < .001).  A 
Gender x Task interaction emerged only in the comparison of emotionally arousing with 
incongruent stimuli, F (1, 128) = 5.17, p = .025.  Separate ANOVAs were conducted for each 
condition and each gender.  Men were faster than women in the incongruent and not emotionally 
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 arousing condition, F (1, 128) = 6.59, p = .011.  RT was slower for incongruent than emotionally 
arousing words in men, F (1, 61) = 82.55, p < .001, and women, F (1, 67) = 141.51, p < .001.   
Emotion Vs. Color-word Stroop: Early Visual Sensory Processing  
A Group (comorbid, anxious apprehension, anxious arousal, anhedonic depression, 
control) x Gender (female, male) x Task (emotion-word, color-word), x Condition (pleasant and 
congruent, unpleasant and incongruent) x Hemisphere (left, right) MANOVA was conducted 
separately for P100, N200, P300, and N400 amplitude and P300 latency (see Figures 1 and 2 for 
grand-average waveforms for representative channels in both tasks).  As mentioned above, main 
effects and interactions with the “condition” factor were not fully interpretable with respect to 
critical task comparisons.  When condition effects emerged, targeted contrasts were pursued in 
order to compare the emotion with the color-word Stroop tasks, in line with critical hypotheses.  
Specifically, 1) unpleasant stimuli were compared separately to congruent,  incongruent, and an 
average of congruent and incongruent stimuli.  2) An average of emotionally arousing stimuli 
(pleasant and unpleasant) was compared separately to congruent, incongruent, and an average of 
congruent and incongruent stimuli, following hypotheses 2 and 3. 
P100.  P100 was larger over the right than left hemisphere, F (1, 120) = 32.01, p < .001.  
No other effects emerged. 
N200.  N200 amplitude was larger for women, F (1, 120) = 9.26, p = .003, and larger 
over the left than right hemisphere, F (1, 120) = 6.62, p = .011.  A Group x Condition 
interaction, 4 F (4, 120) = 2.50, p = .046, was qualified by a Group x Gender x Condition 
interaction, F (4, 120) = 2.78, p = .030.  The latter effect also qualified the gender main effect.  
Targeted contrasts interrogated the interaction of group, gender, and condition.  These contrasts 
followed the hypothesis that emotional (either unpleasant specifically or emotionally arousing 
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 more generally) stimuli would be prioritized over neutral stimuli if there is a “bias” for emotional 
stimuli at this early time point (hypothesis 2).  Separate Gender x Condition ANOVAs were 
conducted for each group, comparing a) unpleasant to congruent stimuli, b) unpleasant to 
incongruent stimuli, and c) unpleasant to the average of congruent and incongruent stimuli.  
When comparing unpleasant to congruent stimuli, N200 amplitude was larger for congruent than 
unpleasant stimuli in the anxious apprehension, F (1, 15) = 6.83, p = .020, and control groups, F 
(1, 41) = 18.03, p < .001.  No main effects or interactions emerged for the other groups.  When 
comparing unpleasant to incongruent stimuli, N200 amplitude was larger for incongruent than 
unpleasant stimuli in the anxious apprehension, F (1, 15) = 6.61, p = .021, and control groups, F 
(1, 41) = 27.40, p < .001.  No main effects or interactions emerged for the other groups.  Finally, 
in a comparison of unpleasant to the average of congruent and incongruent stimuli, N200 
amplitude was larger for congruent and incongruent than unpleasant stimuli in the anxious 
apprehension, F (1, 15) = 6.61, p = .021, and control groups, F (1, 41) = 26.69, p < .001.  No 
main effects or interactions emerged for the comorbid, anxious arousal, and anhedonic 
depression groups.  
The second set of contrasts (following hypothesis 2) involved separate Gender x 
Condition ANOVAs conducted for each group, comparing a) emotionally arousing to congruent 
stimuli, b) emotionally arousing to incongruent stimuli, and c) emotionally arousing to the 
average of congruent and incongruent stimuli.  When comparing emotionally arousing and 
congruent stimuli, N200 amplitude was larger for congruent than emotionally arousing stimuli in 
the anxious arousal, F (1, 22) = 5.84, p = .024, and control groups, F (1, 41) = 14.21, p = .001.  
No main effects or interactions emerged for the other groups.  When comparing emotionally 
arousing to incongruent stimuli, the anxious arousal group showed a Gender x Condition 
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 interaction, F (1, 22) = 6.38, p = .019 (see Figure 4).  Anxious arousal men showed larger N200 
amplitude for incongruent than emotionally arousing stimuli, F (1, 11) = 8.69, p = .013.  Anxious 
arousal women did not differentiate incongruent from emotionally arousing stimuli, suggesting 
equivalent attention to stimuli in these two task contexts.  The control group showed a main 
effect of condition, F (1, 41) = 6.66, p = .014, and a Gender x Condition interaction, F (1, 41) = 
4.69, p = .036 (see Figure 4).  Control men did not differentiate incongruent from emotionally 
arousing stimuli, suggesting equivalent attention to stimuli in these two task contexts.  Control 
women showed larger N200 amplitude for incongruent than emotionally arousing stimuli, 
Condition F (1, 19) = 6.74, p = .018.  No main effects or interactions emerged for the comorbid, 
anxious apprehension, and anhedonic depression groups.  When comparing emotionally arousing 
to the average of congruent and incongruent stimuli, N200 amplitude was larger for neutral than 
emotionally arousing stimuli in the anxious arousal, F (1, 22) = 18.13, p = .011, and control 
groups, F (1, 41) = 21.17, p < .001.  No main effects or interactions emerged for the other 
groups. 
Emotion Compared to Color-word Stroop: Later Processing   
P300.  P300 amplitude was larger in the color- than emotion-word Stroop task, F (1, 120) 
= 33.18, p < .001.  This main effect of task was qualified by a Task x Hemisphere effect, F (1, 
120) = 31.58, p < .001.  Task ANOVAs were conducted for each hemisphere.  P300 amplitude 
was larger in the color- than emotion-word Stroop in the right but not left hemisphere, F (1, 120) 
= 79.31, p < .001.  A Group x Condition x Hemisphere effect, F (4, 120) = 2.55, p = .043, was 
qualified by a Group x Gender x Condition x Hemisphere effect, F (4, 120) = 5.03, p = .001.  
Targeted contrasts followed the hypothesis that emotional (either unpleasant specifically or 
emotionally arousing more generally) stimuli would be prioritized over neutral stimuli if there is 
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 a “bias” for emotional stimuli at this later time point (hypothesis 3).  Specifically, the first set of 
contrasts involved separate Gender x Condition x Hemisphere ANOVAs conducted for each 
group, comparing a) unpleasant to congruent stimuli, b) unpleasant to incongruent stimuli, and c) 
unpleasant to the average of congruent and incongruent stimuli.   
When comparing unpleasant to congruent stimuli, a Condition x Hemisphere interaction 
emerged for the anxious arousal, F (1, 22) = 5.81, p = .025, and control groups, F (1, 41) = 4.09, 
p = .050.  P300 amplitude was larger in the right hemisphere for congruent than unpleasant 
stimuli in the anxious arousal, F (1, 22) = 5.52, p = .028, and control groups, F (1, 41) = 13.41, p 
= .001.  No effects emerged for the other groups.  When comparing unpleasant to incongruent 
stimuli, P300 amplitude was larger over right than left hemisphere in the comorbid group, F ( 1, 
19) = 6.11, p = .023, qualified by a Gender x Hemisphere interaction, F ( 1, 19) = 7.99, p = .011.  
P300 amplitude was larger over right than left hemisphere in comorbid men, F (1, 5) = 6.48, p = 
.050, but not in comorbid women.  A Condition x Hemisphere interaction emerged for the 
anxious arousal, F (1, 22) = 6.34, p = .020, and control groups, F (1, 41) = 8.90, p = .005.  P300 
amplitude was larger over right than left hemisphere in the anxious arousal group for incongruent 
words, F (1, 22) = 6.66, p = .017.  P300 amplitude was larger over right hemisphere for 
incongruent than unpleasant stimuli in the control group, F (1, 41) = 5.85, p = .020.  No effects 
emerged for the anxious apprehension or anhedonic depression group.  Finally, when comparing 
unpleasant to the average of congruent and incongruent stimuli, a Condition x Hemisphere 
interaction emerged for the anxious arousal, F (1, 22) = 7.52, p = .012, and control groups, F (1, 
41) = 6.99, p = .012.  P300 amplitude was larger over right than left hemisphere in the anxious 
arousal group for incongruent and congruent words, F (1, 22) = 7.83, p = .010.  P300 amplitude 
was larger over right hemisphere for congruent and incongruent stimuli than unpleasant stimuli 
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 in the control group, F (1, 41) = 10.99, p = .002.  No effects emerged for the comorbid, anxious 
apprehension, and anhedonic depression groups.  
The second set of contrasts following hypothesis 3 involved separate Gender x Condition 
x Hemisphere ANOVAs conducted for each group, comparing a) emotionally arousing to 
congruent stimuli, b) emotionally arousing to incongruent stimuli, and c) emotionally arousing to 
the average of congruent and incongruent stimuli.  When comparing emotionally arousing to 
congruent stimuli, the anxious apprehension, F (1, 15) = 4.72, p = .046, anxious arousal, F (1, 
22) = 8.45, p = .008, and anhedonic depression groups, F (1, 22) = 5.24, p = .032, showed a 
Condition x Hemisphere interaction.  Separate Hemisphere ANOVAs were done for each 
condition, and separate Condition ANOVAs were done for each hemisphere.  There was a trend 
for P300 amplitude to be larger in the right than left hemisphere for neutral than emotionally 
arousing stimuli in the anxious apprehension group, F (1, 15) = 4.24, p = .056.  P300 amplitude 
was larger in right than left hemisphere for neutral than emotionally arousing stimuli in the 
anxious arousal group, F (1, 23) = 5.71, p = .025.  No effects emerged in this dissection of the 
interaction in the comorbid or anhedonic depression group.  A main effect of task, F (1, 41) = 
12.89, p = .011, and a Gender x Hemisphere interaction, F (1, 41) = 4.61, p = .038, emerged for 
the control group.  P300 amplitude was larger over right than left hemisphere in men only, F (1, 
22) = 7.13, p = .014. 
When comparing emotionally arousing to incongruent stimuli, the comorbid group 
showed a Gender x Condition interaction, F (1, 19) = 4.85, p = .040, a Gender x Hemisphere 
interaction, F (1, 19) = 7.48, p = .013, and a Condition x Hemisphere interaction, F (1, 19) = 
7.72, p = .012.  All three of these interactions were qualified by a Gender x Condition x 
Hemisphere interaction, F (1, 19) = 4.50, p = .047 (see Figure 4).  Separate Condition x 
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 Hemisphere ANOVAs were conducted for each gender.  Comorbid men showed a Hemisphere 
effect, F (1, 5) = 8.13, p = .036, and a Condition x Hemisphere interaction, F (1, 5) = 6.60, p = 
.050, followed up with separate Hemisphere ANOVAs for each condition, and separate 
Condition ANOVAs for each hemisphere.  P300 amplitude was larger in the right than left 
hemisphere in the incongruent condition only in comorbid men, F (1, 5) = 12.20, p = .017.  P300 
amplitude was larger for the incongruent than emotionally arousing stimuli in comorbid women, 
F (1, 14 ) = 9.58, p = .008.  A Condition x Hemisphere interaction emerged for the anxious 
arousal, F (1, 22) = 7.95, p = .010, and control groups, F (1, 41) = 8.77, p = .005, followed up 
with separate Hemisphere ANOVAs for each condition, and separate Condition ANOVAs for 
each hemisphere.  P300 amplitude was larger over left than right hemisphere in the incongruent 
condition in the anxious arousal group, F (1, 23) = 6.66, p = .017.  P300 amplitude was larger in 
the right hemisphere for incongruent than emotionally arousing stimuli in the control group, F (1, 
42) =.6.36, p = .016.  No effects emerged for the anxious apprehension and anhedonic depression 
group. 
Finally, when comparing emotionally arousing to the average of congruent and 
incongruent stimuli, a main effect of condition, F (1, 20) = 5.96, p = .024, was qualified by a 
Gender x Condition interaction in the comorbid group.  Only comorbid women showed larger 
P300 amplitude for congruent and incongruent than emotionally arousing stimuli.  Comorbid 
men did not differentiate congruent and incongruent from emotionally arousing stimuli, 
suggesting equivalent attention to stimuli in these two task contexts.  A Condition x Hemisphere 
effect, F (1, 15) = 5.39, p = .035, emerged for the anxious apprehension group in the absence of a 
main effect of condition or hemisphere.  P300 amplitude was larger for the color- than emotion-
word Stroop over right hemisphere only in this group, F (1, 15) = 6.86, p = .019.  A main effect 
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 of condition, F (1, 22) = 6.49, p = .018, was qualified by a Condition x Hemisphere effect in the 
anxious arousal group, F (1, 22) = 12.42, p = .002.  P300 amplitude was larger for the color- than 
emotion-word Stroop over right hemisphere only, F (1, 22) = 13.28, p = .001.  The control group 
showed both a main effect of condition, F (1, 41) = 28.47, p <.001, and a Condition x 
Hemisphere effect, F (1, 41) = 12.18, p = .001.  P300 amplitude was larger for the color- than 
emotion-word Stroop over left, F (1, 41) = 10.66, p = .002, and right hemisphere, F (1, 41) = 
49.86, p <.001.  No effects emerged for the anhedonic depression group. 
N400.  N400 amplitude was larger over left than right hemisphere, F (1, 120) = 31.09, p 
<.001.  No other effects emerged.  
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 CHAPTER 4  
DISCUSSION1 
 Although recent theorizing assumes it, the specificity of attentional bias to emotional 
stimuli in anxiety is unclear.  So-called neutral or “non-emotional” stimuli varying in attentional 
processing demands have not been systematically investigated or contrasted with emotional 
stimuli.  Clarifying this issue is critical in understanding the specificity of preferential attention 
to emotional (particularly threatening) stimuli in anxiety and has implications for supporting 
and/or refining the hypothesis that preferential attention to threatening stimuli is an etiological 
and maintaining factor of anxiety.  The present study focused on two sets of analyses.  First, 
anhedonic depression and comorbid groups were investigated as control groups within the 
emotion-word Stroop task to see whether attentional bias (early sensory attentional bias in 
particular) was specific to anxiety.  Second, the emotion- and color-word Stroop tasks were 
directly compared in order to investigate whether preferential processing of emotional over 
neutral stimuli relies on the nature of the neutral stimulus, specifically whether neutral stimuli 
are more attentionally demanding. 
Emotion-word Stroop Findings 
The first hypothesis, that preferential early sensory attention would be specific to anxiety, 
was not supported.  The present findings extend Sass et al. (2010) by finding preferential 
processing of unpleasant than pleasant stimuli in anhedonic depression, consistent with the 
hypothesis that depression should be associated with mood-congruent biases in attention (Beck, 
1976), and not only in anxiety.  The anhedonic depression group also showed evidence for 
preferential processing of emotionally arousing over neutral stimuli.  Thus, early sensory 
preferential processing of emotional stimuli was not specific to anxiety in the present study.  
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 Whereas anxiety has been strongly associated with an attentional bias to threatening or 
unpleasant stimuli (Fox et al., 2002; McNally, 1998; Williams et al., 1996), evidence for such 
bias in depression has been mixed (for reviews see Gotlib & Joormann, in press; Mineka, 
Watson, & Clark, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 2005).  The present data showing early bias in 
depression are consistent with previous findings.  Specifically, when attentional bias is found in 
depression, several patterns emerge.  First, unpleasant stimuli are sometimes prioritized 
(Bradley, Mogg, & Lee, 1997; Gotlib & Cane, 1987) consistent with mood-congruent processing 
as predicted by Beck (1976).  Second, evidence for insufficient attention to pleasant stimuli is 
sometimes found (Gilboa & Gotlib, 1997; Gotlib, McLachlan, & Katz, 1988; McCabe & Gotlib, 
1995; McCabe, Gotlib, & Martin, 2000), suggesting that biases can result in an 
underprioritization of information inconsistent with mood rather than a prioritization of 
information consistent with mood.  Finally, a lack of differentiation between pleasant and 
unpleasant stimuli is sometimes found (e.g., McCabe & Gotlib, 1995), suggesting an evenhanded 
attentional strategy and inconsistent with a mood-congruent bias. Given the inconsistent 
inclusion of pleasant stimuli in this literature (e.g., Mathews, Ridgeway, & Williamson, 1997) 
and a general lack of consideration for whether pleasant and unpleasantly valenced emotional 
stimuli are matched on emotional arousal, it is possible that an emotional arousal confound 
contributed to variance in past findings.  
In the present study, anxious apprehension and anhedonic depression were associated 
with an early sensory preferential bias for emotional stimuli, whereas comorbidity was not. 
Anxiety and depression are frequently comorbid (Brown, Campbell, Lehman, Grisham, & 
Mancill, 2001; Joormann et al., 2005; Kessler et al., 1999; Sanderson, DiNardo, Rapee, & 
Barlow, 1990).  With few exceptions, studies have not carefully screened anxious participants for 
44 
 
 high levels of depression and vice versa.  Thus, given symptom overlap in previous studies, the 
present study adds to the literature by suggesting that attentional bias occurs in individuals 
endorsing “pure” depression, without co-occurring anxiety symptoms. 
Anxious arousal and anhedonic depression were associated with faster evaluation of 
emotionally arousing than neutral stimuli at a later time point (P300 latency), in the absence of 
such effects in the comorbid, anxious apprehension, or control groups.  Faster evaluation of 
emotionally arousing stimuli in the anxious arousal and anhedonic depression groups suggests 
that emotional arousal facilitates rather than hinders emotional stimulus processing at a later time 
point, contrary to suggestions that emotional content may lead to greater elaborative processing 
(e.g., Fox et al., 2002; Mogg and Bradley, 2005).  That the anhedonic depression group did not 
show slower evaluation (as reflected in P300 latency) of unpleasant than pleasant information 
suggests that unpleasant stimuli are not uniformly preferentially processed in depression at all 
attentional processing stages.  
Separate analyses (not reported here) were conducted on individuals who met criteria for 
a DSM-IV-TR diagnosis of an anxiety disorder (without depression) or a depression diagnosis 
(without anxiety).  The anxious but not the depressed group showed preferential early sensory 
processing of unpleasant compared to pleasant stimuli and emotionally arousing compared to 
neutral stimuli in the absence of later effects.  Depressed women showed later preferential 
processing of emotionally arousing stimuli.  The comorbid group showed no preferential 
processing effects.  These findings are mentioned here to illustrate that dimensional and 
categorical classification of anxiety and depression result in different but related patterns of 
processing.  Thus, how anxiety and depression are defined likely further contributes to mixed 
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 findings of bias in the anxiety and depression literature and remains an important variable to be 
systematically studied in future research. 
Emotion- and Color-Word Stroop Comparison 
 The second set of analyses in the present study directly compared emotion- and color-
word Stroop tasks in order to investigate whether preferential processing of emotional stimuli 
seen in the emotion-word Stroop context, relying on comparisons with neutral stimuli with no 
inherent conflict, would generalize to a comparison with non-emotional stimuli from the color-
word Stroop context, which are presumably more difficult to process due to inherent potential 
conflict between word meaning and word color (congruent and incongruent stimuli).  There was 
no evidence for either early or later preferential processing of emotional over congruent and 
incongruent stimuli in anxious groups.  Direct comparison of the emotion- and color-word 
Stroop tasks in anxiety and depression suggests that the nature of neutral stimuli used in 
comparisons with emotional stimuli matters.  Present N200 and P300 evidence for preferential 
attention to emotional over neutral stimuli occurred only within the emotion-word Stroop task, 
where neutral stimuli did not have conflicting color and meaning dimensions.  Conversely, when 
neutral stimuli had potentially competing word color and meaning dimensions, preferential 
processing of emotional stimuli in anxiety and depression was not found.  Indeed, evidence for 
preferential processing of neutral color-word Stroop stimuli over emotionally arousing stimuli 
was found.  A lack of preferential processing of either neutral or emotionally arousing stimuli 
was also found.  No evidence for preferential processing of emotional stimuli over “neutral” 
stimuli from the color-word Stroop task was apparent. 
In future research, neutral stimuli that are easier or harder to process could be contrasted 
with emotional stimuli with varying attentional demands, in order to better evaluate the 
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 conditions under which early or later attention is truly preferential for emotional stimuli in 
anxiety.  The present data challenge the generality of preferential attention to emotional 
information in anxiety and suggest that deployment of attention to emotional vs. non-emotional 
information is constrained by the processing demands associated with emotional and non-
emotional stimuli. 
Intervention Implications 
Present data have several intervention implications.  First, these data suggest that 
investigating unpleasant to the exclusion of pleasant stimuli is misleading.  Within the emotion-
word Stroop task, both anxiety groups showed evidence for preferential processing of 
emotionally arousing stimuli in general, rather than of unpleasant alone.  The anhedonic 
depression group showed evidence for preferential processing of unpleasant over pleasant and 
also of unpleasant and pleasant over neutral stimuli.  Interventions for anxiety and depression 
may benefit from a focus on emotional arousal rather than on unpleasant valence alone.  
Anxiety disorders are thought to be associated with specific fear structures (Foa & 
Kozak, 1986; Lang, 1977, 1979) that become activated when elements of the fear structure are 
encountered.  Furthermore, the fear structure may enhance resource allocation and attentional 
processing of stimuli represented in the structure (Foa, Feske, Murdock, Kozak, & McCarthy, 
1991).  If the fear structure contains information associated primarily with high levels of 
emotional arousal (both pleasant and unpleasant), therapists conducting exposure therapy with 
anxiety clients could highlight the role of emotional arousal in contributing to fear experiences.  
For example, a client with panic disorder with agoraphobia and high levels of anxious arousal, 
who has learned to fear interoceptive cues, could be exposed to pleasurable and highly arousing 
situations (e.g., brisk exercise) as well as unpleasant and highly arousing situations (e.g., a 
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 crowded train in which escape is difficult) to elicit interoceptive cues and associated fear 
structures involved in panic attacks.  Exposure to emotionally arousing situations may more 
completely elicit one’s fear structure and result in faster extinction of associations between 
arousal cues and panic attack responses (Lang, Melamed, & Hart, 1970).  
Another implication of the present data is suggested by the emotion- and color-word 
Stroop task comparison.  Computerized attention training interventions have been successfully 
used by several researchers to modify attentional bias and reduce symptoms of psychopathology.  
For example, MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworth, and Holker (2002) established that 
attention can be trained away from threat stimuli in nonclinical anxiety (measured with the State-
Trait Anxiety Inventory, Spielberger et al., 1968) using a dot probe paradigm in which the probe 
is presented more frequently in the location of a neutral than threatening stimulus.  Using a 
clinical sample and a dot-probe task, Amir, Beard, Burns, and Bomyea (2009) assigned GAD 
participants to a condition in which the probe was presented more frequently in the location of a 
neutral than threatening stimulus.  GAD participants showed reductions in attentional bias to 
threat and a decrease in anxiety symptoms, whereas those assigned to a control condition did not.  
Present data suggest that the nature of neutral stimuli determines whether preferential processing 
of emotional stimuli is apparent.  If attentionally-demanding (i.e., congruent and incongruent 
stimuli from the color-word Stroop task) neutral stimuli are used in attention training 
interventions, training attention toward neutral and away from threatening or unpleasant stimuli 
may not work, or may not work as quickly as interventions using neutral stimuli with fewer 
processing demands.  This is an issue that has not yet been studied in attention training 
interventions but has implications for the generality of attention to emotional over neutral 
information.  
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 Furthermore, to date attention training paradigms have not systematically considered the 
role of emotional arousal nor explored whether training attention away from emotionally 
arousing pleasant stimuli might also result in e.g. lowered self-reported anxiety or depression 
symptoms.  For example, in the case of Panic Disorder, ostensibly pleasant cues associated with 
physiological arousal such as exercise (e.g., McNally, 1990) or relaxation (e.g., Adler, Craske, & 
Barlow, 1987) can trigger panic attacks.  In the case of Major Depressive Disorder, under-
processing of pleasant stimuli (e.g., happy faces, Joormann & Gotlib, 2007) may serve a 
perceived, short-term protective function (e.g., avoid social rejection, Coyne, 1976).  Given 
present findings of early and later attentional biases for emotionally arousing stimuli in anxiety 
and for unpleasant valence and emotionally arousing stimuli in depression, future attention-
training interventions may benefit from using paradigms that target emotional arousal more 
broadly and investigate both early sensory and later elaborative attentional processing more 
carefully, in order to explore the conditions under which early and/or later attentional bias is 
modifiable.   
Anxiety and depression are both characterized by disrupted attention and are likely to 
show deficits in task contexts involving distracting or task-irrelevant emotional and non-
emotional stimuli.  Present data show that emotional information is not always preferentially 
processed in anxiety and depression and that preferential processing may depend on the 
processing demands of neutral stimuli.  Systematic examination of the role of emotional valence, 
emotional arousal, and neutral and emotional stimulus processing demands is crucial to 
understanding so-called “preferential” attention for emotional stimuli in anxiety, depression, and 
comorbidity.  Such work can yield insights into cognition-emotion interactions in 
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 psychopathology that may improve understanding of the etiology and treatment of these 
disorders. 
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 CHAPTER 5 
TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1.  Questionnaire Scores Used in Group Selection 
     MASQ-AA   MASQ-AD  PSWQ  
 
Comorbid    42 (6.8)   27 (3.7)   71 (6.1) 
 
Anxious Apprehension   21 (2.3)   13.2 (2.5)  68 (4.6) 
 
Anxious Arousal   37 (3.8)   15 (2.0)   38 (8.3) 
 
Anhedonic Depression   22 (2.5)   24 (2.8)   36 (9.0) 
 
Control     21 (2.3)   13 (2.5)   38 (8.6) 
 
Note.  Questionnaire scores (mean (SD)) for each group.  The anxious apprehension and 
comorbid group scored higher than the other three groups on the Penn State Worry Questionnaire 
(PSWQ; Sidak ps < .001).  The anxious arousal and comorbid group scored higher than the other 
three groups on the Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire Anxious Arousal scale (MASQ-
AA; Sidak ps < .001).  The anhedonic depression and comorbid group scored higher than the 
other three groups on the MASQ Anhedonic Depression scale (MASQ-AD; Sidak ps < .010).  
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 Figure 1.  Top: Grand-average event-related potential waveforms for representative frontocentral 
sensors for the emotion-word Stroop task, highlighting N400.  Blue, black, and red tracings 
represent pleasant, neutral, and unpleasant stimuli, respectively.  Stimulus onset was at time = 0 
ms.  Bottom: Grand-average event-related potential waveforms for representative posterior 
sensors for the emotion-word Stroop task, highlighting P100, N200, and P300.  Blue, black, and 
red tracings represent pleasant, neutral, and unpleasant stimuli, respectively.  Stimulus onset was 
at time = 0 ms.   
 N400 
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 Figure 1 (continued) 
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 Figure 2.  Top: Grand-average event-related potential waveforms for representative frontocentral 
sensors for the color-word Stroop task, highlighting N400.  Blue, black, black dashed, and red 
tracings represent congruent, neutral within congruent blocks, neutral within incongruent blocks 
and incongruent stimuli, respectively.  Stimulus onset was at time = 0 ms.  Bottom: Grand-
average event-related potential waveforms for representative posterior sensors for the color-word 
Stroop task, highlighting P100, N200, and P300.  Blue, black, black dashed, and red tracings 
represent congruent, neutral within congruent blocks, neutral within incongruent blocks, and 
incongruent stimuli, respectively.  Stimulus onset was at time = 0 ms. 
 N400 
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  Figure 2 (continued).  
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 Figure 3.  N200 amplitude and P300 latency in the emotion-word Stroop task.  Error bars 
represent 1 SE.  Top: N200 emotional arousal effect in the anxious apprehension group and 
emotional valence and emotional arousal effects in the anhedonic depression group.  Bottom: 
P300 latency emotional arousal effect in the anxious arousal and anhedonic depression group. 
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 Figure 4.  N200 and P300 amplitude in the comparison of emotion- and color-word Stroop tasks.  
Error bars represent 1 SE.  Top: N200 amplitude is larger for incongruent than emotionally 
arousing stimuli in anxious arousal men and control women.  Bottom: P300 amplitude is larger 
for incongruent stimuli in the right than left hemisphere in comorbid men and the anxious 
arousal group.  P300 amplitude is larger for incongruent than emotionally arousing stimuli in 
comorbid women.  P300 amplitude is larger for incongruent than emotionally arousing stimuli in 
the right hemisphere only in the anxious apprehension and control groups. 
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 FOOTNOTES 
1 Note that portions of the material in this chapter has been published elsewhere (Sass et al., 
2010). 
2Analyses reported within the emotion-word Stroop task (addressing hypothesis 1) focus on 
an N=64 subset of 128 neutral trials.  Omnibus results did not differ when using the full set of 
128 neutrals, except in one case.  Specifically, the Group x Gender x Hemisphere interaction for 
P100 amplitude became a trend, F (4, 120) = 2.19, p = .074 (previously p = .049).  All other 
effects, including critical tests of hypotheses, remained unchanged. 
3Analyses reported comparing the emotion- and color-word Stroop tasks (addressing 
hypotheses 2 and 3) focus on an N = 32 subset of N=64 pleasant and N=64 unpleasant trials.  
Omnibus results did not differ when using the full set of pleasant and unpleasant trials, except in 
one case.  The Group x Condition effect, F (1, 120) = 2.08, p = .070, became a trend (previously 
p = .046).  The Group x Gender x Condition interaction, F (1, 120) = 2.77, p = .030, remained 
unchanged, as did all other effects and critical tests of hypotheses.   
4Total number of participants was 130 after exclusion for the following reasons: a) more 
than 5% of channels discarded due to artifact (N = 4) and b) amplitude values more than 3 SD 
from the mean for a given component at more than two electrode sites (N = 8).   
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